The Truth We Know Reassessing Suárez’s Account of Cognitive Truth and Objective Being

Abstract

This article aims at reassessing a widespread view, according to which Francisco Suárez left behind the scholastic model of truth as adaequatio, founding a new concept of truth based on his metaphysics
of objective being. In the first part, I reconstruct the debate on the complex and incomplex truth, focusing especially on the sources of Suárez’s Disputation 8, and presenting the views of Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Hervaeus, Durandus, Capreolus and Fonseca. Especially the latter proposes an eclectic synthesis, blending elements from the Dominican tradition and Henry of Ghent. In the second part, I
analyze Suárez’s Disputation 8, showing that his doctrine of truth reprises and mitigates Fonseca’s,
thus following most of the Dominican commentators of Aquinas. Here I explain especially the role
played by objective being in the constitution of the truth in cognoscendo, also showing that the latter
cannot be given without a previous adequation on the level of the truth in significando (the species).
In the third part, I discuss three textual passages used by contemporary historiography to legitimate
Suárez’s alleged abandon of adaequatio, pointing out, in the light of the previous reconstruction,
some misreadings in these interpretations.
Keywords: Truth; judgment; simple apprehension; objective being.
Authors: Aristotle, Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Hervaeus Natalis, Durandus of Saint Porçain, John
Capreolus, Francisco Suárez.